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Historical Resistance Movements and
Modern Euroscepticism
Kamil D. Lungu
Pomona College

Abstract
This study explores the relationship between historical resistance and their relationship to modern-day Euroscepticism. It can be seen that within the European Union
(EU), the political orientation of Eurosceptic parties differs, with some political orientations
being more popular in some parts of the continent compared to others—Eastern European
states tend to have right-wing parties, while many Southern European states having leftwing parties. The author suggests that this is a result of the orientation of the resistance
movements to the state’s historic authoritarian regime. Case studies were conducted on
Spain and Poland—two EU with similar sized area, population, and economies—looking
at their respective resistance movements to authoritarianism and their connection to their
respective dominate Eurosceptic parties, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) and Podemos. The
author observed clear links and similarities between the tactics, ethos, and rhetoric between
these parties and their respective national resistance movements to authoritarianism.
Keywords
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Introduction
Since the inception of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1958, the
Union has grown from a loose economic bloc of six nations to an ever-closer union of 28
states. The most recent wave of expansion occurred after 2004 with the addition of multiple
former Eastern Bloc countries. With expansion, comes immense pushback. One of the visible movements to strengthen itself in the past ten years are Eurosceptic right-wing populist
parties. Law and Justice in Poland and Fidesz in Hungary have managed to win general election in their respective parties, and numerous parties in Scandinavia, the Low Lands, and the
Baltics have managed to hold a considerable number of seats in their respective parliaments.
Yet, right-wing populism has not managed to garner immense favor in many Southern European countries. Golden Dawn in Greece holds less than 8% of the seats in parliament and
right-wing populist parties do not hold seats in the Spanish or Portuguese parliaments.
Even though commentators have suggested that economic anxieties are to blame
for the rise of right-wing populism, this does not take into count many Southern Mediterranean countries ability to withstand right-wing populism despite economic malaise and crisis.
Instead, one must look into the complex political histories of these countries, specifically
their relationship to authoritarianism and resistance. Because Euroscepticism sees the European Union as a threat to national sovereignty and liberty, a country’s Eurosceptic movement’s political orientation is dependent on the political orientation of its past resistance
movements against authoritarianism. This paper aspires to isolate and identify the process in
which resistance movements inspire and lead the formation of Eurosceptic parties when a
member state engages with the projection of European integration. This will be determined
through case studies of Poland and Spain, both nations from the regions in question that
have went through similar processes of democratization.
Literature Review
European Party Politics
Because of the domination of proportional voting systems and parliamentary democracy, all EU member states have multi-party systems with a diverse array of parties
being represent in both national parliaments and in supranational organizations such as the
European Parliament (EP) (Dinan, 2010, p.245). The two biggest groups that dominate
European party politics are the Socialists and the Christian Democrats (Dinan, 2010, p.247).
They lie respectively on the center-left and center-right of the political spectrum and have
been crucial in pushing European integration; both parties represent demographics that have
generally benefited from economic integration: heavy industry supporting the Socialists and
farmers being crucial support for Christian Democratic parties (Dinan, 2010, p. 248). Liberal parties—parties dedicated to both political liberty and economic liberalism—tend to be
third largest political parties in legislative bodies and too espouse pro-European sentiments,
mainly because of the possibility for further economic liberalization through integration
(Dinan, 2010, p. 249).
Conservative right-wing parties and far-left wing populist parties have a strong
presence on the European scene and have achieved electoral prominence in both the EP
and numerous national parliaments, such as Poland’s Sejm and the British House of Commons (Dinan, 2010, p.250). Even though these parties come from very different ends of the
political spectrum and have contradictory world views, both are hot-beds of Euroscepticism
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(Dinan, 2010, p.250). Conservative and nationalist parties object to European integration
because of its threats on national sovereignty and on the preservation of national identities.
Sentiments range from stressing reforms and addressing the democracy gap to outright dismantlement of the EU. Far-left parties tend to have grievances in regard to the economic
liberalization and globalization that European integration has brought on, with many of
these parties being sympathetic to introducing command economies and nostalgic of Communist rule (Dinan, 2010, p.250).
Euroscepticism
Euroscepticism and its presence in both public opinion and in the electoral systems
have been the subject of study by many political scientists. British scholars Paul Taggart and
Aleks Szczerbiak examined the nature of Eurosceptic parties in both EU member and candidate states in their article “The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States”. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) were particular interested in the abundance
and influence Eurosceptic parties had on candidate states in particular (p.2). Their work is
key in providing a clear and concise working definitions of Euroscepticism, in which they
identify two key forms:
1.

2.

Hard Euroscepticism, “a principled opposition to the EU and European
integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their counties
should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are
tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration
as it is currently conceived”
Soft- Euroscepticism- “is NOT a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy
areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where
there is a sense that ’national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU’s
trajectory” (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002, p.7)

Both forms of Euroscepticism center their ideologies on a dichotomy that sets the nation
and its interests in opposition to the EU and its interests. This usually is manifested in hard
Eurosceptic rhetoric claiming that the EU is too capitalist, socialist, neoliberal, or bureaucratic—depending of course on ideological position of the Eurosceptic (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002, p.8). Soft-Eurosceptic rhetoric on the other hand focuses more on critiquing
the pace or objectives of integration, claiming that current agenda of integration goes against
national interests (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002, p.8). They then looked at the number and
performance of both types of parties in EU member and candidate states, finding that softEurosceptic parties in particular were popular in eastern and central European candidate
states and that many of them were of a right-leaning orientation (Taggart & Szczerbiak,
2002, p.16). Meanwhile, soft-Eurosceptic parties tended to have less electoral influence
in member states and that hard-Eurosceptic parties tended to be more significant in their
respective country’s electoral process (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002, p.17). Eurosceptic parties also tended to be from both ends of the political spectrum in member states (Taggart
& Szczerbiak, 2002, p.18). Even though Taggart and Szczerbiak were thorough in their
identification of Euroscepticism, they failed to look at the reasons why these parties are
Historical Resistance Movements and Modern Euroscepticism

72

Kamil D. Lungu Pomona College

popular, nor the reason why certain political ideologies are associated with Euroscepticism.
A number of studies looked at the public and their views on European integration.
One article by Oxford political scientist Lauren McLaren questioned a common theory for
one’s support for European integration in which peoples tend to see integration as a cost/
benefit analysis. McLaren (2002) instead argues that people tend not to support European
integration because of a utilitarian cost/benefit analysis, but because they see integration and
the EU as threats to cultural identity and the nation-state (p. 560). She looked at the 2000
Eurobarometer results and isolated the poll responses that looked at feelings towards the EU
and compared them to the education and occupation of the respondent; she then compared
that to the Eurobarometer question regarding perceived threats and also compared that with
the respondent’s education and occupation (McLaren, 2002, p. 560). She notices that in
both independent variables, lower educated responded and more working-class respondents
showed higher levels of ill-feelings the EU and perceived more a threat from foreign cultures, concluding that both theories present valid explanations to why certain groups have
Eurosceptic feelings and thus, vote for Eurosceptic parties (McLaren, 2002, p. 563).
In addition to McLaren’s work, Hungarian political scientist Gabriella Ilonszki
(2009) looked at another factor that might influence voters to sway voting for Eurosceptic
parties, and that is general discontent in relations to their respective national governments
(p.1041). She does this by looking at opinion polling in regard to people’s satisfaction with
their economic and political systems between seven Central and Eastern European (CEE)
countries: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, and Slovakia (p.1041).
Ilonszki (2009) noticed a divide between the CEEs, specifically that a line can be drawn
between countries with higher rates of satisfaction—Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic,
and Bulgaria—and countries with lower degrees of satisfaction—Estonia, Slovenia, and Slovakia (p.1046) Countries with higher satisfaction rates usually had center-right Eurosceptic
parties in power (or recently have been in power) and countries with lower rates had more
pro-European parties in power (Ilonszki, 2009, p. 1045). Also, the countries with lower satisfaction rates had stronger economic satisfaction, in addition to two of them accepting the
Euro (Ilonszki, 2009, 1047). Ilonszki (2009) is keen in pointing out that the countries that
had lower satisfaction rates were two newer states compared to states with higher satisfaction rates (Ilonszki, 2009, p.1055). With that fact in mind, Iloszki (2002) is keen in stressing the optimistic view European integration has on states that are either newer, and that
a pessimism is present in already established states in regard to integration (p. 1055). This
pessimism can be attributed to the fact that many of these more established states—Poland,
Hungary—have historicaly been active in their fights to keep sovereignty and thus, integration might lose something that they fought hard for (Ilonszki, 2009, p. 1056).
As shown by existing literature on the subject, Euroscepticism is a feature that is
present in many political orientations and persuasions. In addition, success of Eurosceptic
parties has shown to be reliant on general Eurosceptic feelings amongst voters and that those
feelings are dependent on a variety of factors, such as a voter’s social background. Yet, the
literature shows a gap in deciphering the character and nuances between the various Euroscepticisms present in EU member and candidate states.
Hypothesis
If a country’s Eurosceptic movement’s political orientation is dependent on the
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2018/iss1/8
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political orientation of its past resistance movements against authoritarianism, then nationalistic resistance movements will lead to a country having nationalistic and right-leaning
Eurosceptic parties.
Methods
The author will conduct two case studies in order to isolate the connections between modern Eurosceptic parties and historical resistance movements: one on the Republic
of Poland and one on the Kingdom of Spain. The author selected these countries because:
a) both countries are of a similar area, population, and economic status (Spain being the
larger, yet less stable of the two); b) both countries have experienced authoritarian regimes
with command economies and have successfully transitioned to free-market democracies;
and c) have experienced the rise of Eurosceptic parties in the past ten years (Law and Justice
in Poland, and Podemos in Spain). Each case study will look at each country’s previous
authoritarian regimes; the opposition to each regime; the successive transition to democracy; the formation of their new multi-party systems; and the connection their Eurosceptic
party has to the aforementioned process. The latter portion of each cases study will look at
the orientation and origin of their most prominent Eurosceptic party. The Polish study will
examine Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)—Law and Justice in English—which has been in
government since 2015. The Spanish study will examine Podemos, which currently holds
the third-highest number of seats in the Spanish Cortes Generales.
Case Studies
Spain
Franco’s Spain. From 1939 to Franco’s death in 1975, Spain was under the authoritarian rule of General Francisco Franco. Franco and his nationalist forces won a long
and bloody civil war that ended the democratic and pluralistic Second Spanish Republic.
Franco declared that Spain instead will, “follow the structure of the totalitarian regimes, as in
Italy and Germany. It will be dressed in corporative forms and will do away with liberal institutions which have poisoned the people,” (Alba, 1978, p. 175). Franco became the Caudillo and established a fascist regime based on Spanish nationalism, extreme Catholic piety,
and a state-run economy based on agriculture and natural resource extraction (Alba, 1978,
p. 176). Censorship was rampant and civil society was reduced to state-sponsored activities,
such as the Church, and produced an intellectual climate that historian Victor Alba (1978)
described as being, “cloaked oppressively in gray”(p. 199). In the initial stages of Franco’s
New State, much of the opposition was crushed during the Civil War or lived in exile in
other Western states; these exiles did present considerable influence on their host country’s
relations with Spain. This was one of many factors that lead to Spain’s eventual isolation and
need to liberalize.
Thanks to the advocacy of Spanish exiles, the United States refused to sponsor
Spain in their Marshall Plan (Alba, 1978, p. 199). Countries that did receive those funds,
such as Germany and France, experienced healthy economic development and eventual
returned to stable democracies. Spain also was isolated by the Soviet Union, with Joseph
Stalin asserting his desire to keep Spain isolated as long as Franco was in power (Alba, 1978,
p. 202). Neither did authoritarian regimes in Latin American support Franco political or
financially, with Argentina’s Juan Peron refusing to send food aid in reaction to Spain’s unHistorical Resistance Movements and Modern Euroscepticism
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reliability in sending machinery (Alba, 1978, p. 201). Francoist Spain became notorious for
its underdevelopment and income inequality: in 1960, 42% of the population depended on
agriculture and the top 8% of Spaniards received 36% of the Gross National Product (GNP)
(Alba, 1978, p. 223). The drastic economic situation pressured Franco’s regime to consider
liberal economic reforms and ending censorship, both policies came arose in tandem with
the rise of a new resistance to Franco’s regime.
Opposition. Even though Franco’s Nationalists defeat and purged Republican
forces in the Civil War, survivors and the many in exile helped jumpstart the resistance in
late-Francoist Spain. Much of the resistance during the civil war consisted of Communists,
Anarchists, and other leftist groups. These same groups worked underground, infiltrating
official state labor unions, and organized within these unions to elicit strikes that shook
Franco’s confidence with the middle class and organized labor (Junco & Schubert, 2000,
p. 276). Strikes occurred in 1951, 1956, and 1962 (Alba, 1978, p. 224). The goals of these
strikes were very much rooted in the poor wages and in yearnings for more decentralization
in the workplace; even if they were not explicitly against the Franco regime, it gave enough
of a scare to elicit economic reforms to modernize the Spanish economy.
Franco then set an agenda of desarrollo, or economic modernization, in order to
improve economic conditions. These included the devaluation of the peseta, the lifting of
restrictions on foreign investment, and the withdrawal of a number of states subsidies (Junco
& Schubert, 200, p. 276). This lead to the reduction of the agricultural sector, increased
urbanization, and the rise of Spain’s immense tourism industry (Junco & Schubert, 200,
p. 279). Contrary to Franco’s wishes, desarrollo did not preserve his monopoly of power.
Modernization came in tandem with the rise of a more pluralistic and educated populace
who yearned for more and more opportunity. The increased plurality of Spanish society is
reflected in the pluralistic and diverse opposition that arose, which included:
1.

2.

3.

Students—After the Ministry of Information abolished censorship in
1966, Spanish universities became centers of radical activism and thought
(Coverdale, 1979, p. 9). In addition, between 1960 and 1970 the number
of students enrolled in higher education rose 167% (Covedale, 1979, p. 10).
The intersection of increased university attendance and open curricula made
organizing and protests impactful and frequent. This cumulated in mass protests in 1969 which lead to Franco declaring a national state of emergency
(Junco & Schubert, 2000, p. 278).
The Church—Even though the Catholic Church had special protections
under the Francoist regime, during desarrollo many church leaders in Spain
and Catholic lay groups became disillusioned by Francoism. The liberal
nature of the Second Vatican Council made many clergy in Spain question their complacency to an otherwise growingly un-Catholic regime
(Coverdale, 1979, p. 8).
Regionalists—Social unrest provided an excellent opportunity for many of
Spain’s national minorities to embrace their identities. Economic growth
and the end of censorship triggered the revitalization of Catalan nationalism, characterized by a focus on gaining regional and civil rights (Junco &
Schubert, 200, p. 278). The Basque too had a revival of nationalist feel-
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ings, but unlike the Catalans who advocated for a pluralistic Spain, the
Basque yearned for separatism. This lead to the formation of the Euskadi Ta
Askatasuna (ETA) and an increase of Basque terrorism (Junco & Schubert,
200, p. 286).
Political Parties—Although the only legal party during Franco’s regime was
his Falangist party, desarrollo encouraged many clandestine parties to reorganize. By Franco’s death, the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE) and
the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) managed to form a powerful presence
on the Spanish political scene (Junco & Schubert, 200, p. 306). Both managed to preserve their parties throughout the regime through communities
of exiles (Alba, 1978, p. 239), yet the PCE especially had an active presence
in late Francoist Spain, manly due to the financial support of foreign communist parties and their distancing from the Soviet Union (Alba, 1978, p.
240). Christian Democratic parties formed too in conjunction with leftist
groups and represented many moderates in Spanish society (Alba, 1978, p.
228).

The Spanish resistance represented everything that the Franco regime was not:
pluralistic, inclusive, and very much for an open and connected society that put justice and
liberty at the center. The fact that much of the resistance either rejected or was indifferent
to Spanish nationalism shows the possibility that such political persuasion will be limited in
its presence in the new Spain.
The New Party System. Franco’s death in 1975 ushered the possibility of having a fully democratic Spain. After 1975, a number of administrations came into power
in order to provided political stability and facilitate the transition. It was not until Adolfo
Suarez’s appointment in July 1976 when drastic political reform took place, leading to Spain
first free elections since the Civil War (Gunther, Sani, & Shabad, 1988, p. 35). Over 150
parties registered to be on the ballot in 1977, yet four parties dominated: the PSOE, the
PCE, the centrist Union de Centro Democratio (UCD), and the rightist Alianza Popular
(AP). The UCD became the largest party in the Spanish Cortes with 34% of the vote, followd by the PSOE with 29%; both the PCE and the AP received around 10%, enough to
have a significant presence in policy making (Gunther, Sani, & Shabad, 1988, p. 38). The
results of the 1977 election followed for he is following decade, with the Spanish voting
mostly for either the PSOE or the UCD, both relatively centrist parties (Gunther, Sani, &
Shabad, 1988, p. 92). This showed a general attitude amongst Spanish voters that the time
had come for political compromise and cooperation and a rejection of ideological extremes.
The AP, a party founded by former Francoists Manuel Fraga, fell to a sad fourth place in
the 1977 election (Gunther, Sani, & Shabad, 1988, p. 38). Fraga’s AP eventual transformed
itself to the Partido Popular (PP) and spearheaded the Centro Democratico, a coalition of
Christian democratic and liberal parties. This encouraged the PP to move to the center and
help it shed its Francoist reputation, leading to the election of PP leader Jose Maria Anzar
as prime minister in 1996.
Spanish Integration to the European Project. Spain aspired to join the
European project since the times of Franco. Franco’s policy of desarrollo kick started
Spanish integration with advocating Spain’s admission to the European Common Market
Historical Resistance Movements and Modern Euroscepticism
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in 1970 (Alba, 1978, p. 229). This encouraged economic integration and opened Spain’s
ability to export its goods to other western European states, in addition to opening up the
ability for Spaniards to work in other states so they can send back remittances (Alba, 1978,
p. 229). With European integration being central to Spain’s economic development, a
majority of Spain’s political parties post-Franco became enamored in European Integration.
All of the main Spanish parties—except the Communists—support Spain’s accession to
the European Community. In 1986 under the PSOE government of prime minister
Felipe Gonzalez, Spain—along with Portugal, another former fascist state—joined into the
European Community (Dinan, 2010, p. 76).
Podemos. The 2008 global financial crisis was devastating for the Spanish economy. Spain’s GDP in 2009 fell by 3.4% and unemployment doubled to 20% (Rendueles
& Sola, 2015, p. 1). In 2011, immense popular protests broke out in Spain in rejection
of austerity measure put in place by recommendation of the European Central Bank and
Germany (Rendueles & Sola, 2015, p. 1). These protests brought rise to the 15M movement. Headed by a number of radical leftist groups and labor unions such as the Democracia
Real Ya (Real Democracy Now), the movement lead immense demonstrations with the
biggest ones held in Madrid’s Puerta Del Sol in May 2011, with over 6 million participants (Rendueles & Sola, 2015, p. 1). Granted the size of the protest, the Spanish political
establishment represented by the PSOE and the PP failed to become proactive in regard to
the demands of the protestors, nor did the 15M movement directly feed into an organized
electoral force. This changed with the formation of the left-wing populist party Podemos
in 2014 (Rendueles & Sola, 2015, p. 1). Founded by a group of radical leftist professors,
Podemos has managed to become the third largest party in the Cortes in the past two
Spanish general elections (Tremlett, 2015, p. 1). Podemos can thank their success by the
fact that from all parties present in the Spanish political scene, it is the first in a while to
question the current political status quo while still being accessible to voters. The young
and charismatic leader of Podemos, Pablo Iglesias, made his mark at a rally in 2013 calling
for Spaniards to resists “financial totalitarianism” of austerity (Tremlett, 2015, p. 1). He and
his party blame the massive inequalities in Spain to the failure of the “neoliberal establishment”, which includes the EU, in satisfying the needs of the people and thus, prevent
people from taking control of their own destinies. They too stress the importance of forming bonds and solidary amongst all marginalized groups and struggles, moving away from
classic leftist narrative of class struggle (Tremlett, 2015, p. 1). Even though they come from
the same radical tradition as the PCE and other radical leftist groups, Podemos embraced
social media and television. Their presence in popular media is the key reason why they
have managed to garner so much support, especially when present radical parties fail to
embrace new forms of communication (Tremlett, 2015, p. 1).
Podemos does not explicitly call itself a Eurosceptic party, nor is that mentioned
in their party platform. Spain is generally considered to be one of the least Eurosceptic
states in the EU; even after the 2008 financial crisis, Eurobarometer results showed that
Spaniards with negative feelings towards the EU were below the EU average (Ramos &
Cornago, 2016, p. 1). Thus, it is unusual for Euroscepticism to a take decisive role in party
politics. This brings into question if Podemos is actually Eurosceptic or not. When looking
at Podemos’ voting record in the European Parliament, Podemos votes almost identically
with other soft-Eurosceptic parties such as Greece’s Syriza and France’s National Front on
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2018/iss1/8
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issues regarding further economic and political integration (Ramos & Cornago, 2016, p. 1).
The only issues that Podemos had voting against the grain of Eurosceptics is the role of their
Euro. Podemos very much has voted in support of keeping the common currency, a position similar to Syriza (Ramos & Cornago, 2016, p. 1). Yet, unlike other Eurosceptic parties,
Podemos voters are generally optimistic of the EU and hope for further integration in the
future, under more populist and democratic vision (Ramos & Cornago, 2016, p. 1). This
paradox shows that Podemos is strictly a soft-Eurosceptic party and that its Euroscepticism
is more consequential than it being central to their ideology.
Poland

People’s Republic of Poland. From the end of the Second World War to
the end of the Round Table talks of 1989, Poland was a single-party communist state.
The Soviet Union entrenched communism in Poland in their plan in creating a layer of
communist satellite states. The Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) was the only legal
political force in a formerly democratic nation (Balzyca & Rapacki, 1991, p. 4). Poland
went through periods of both extreme political repression and liberalism through its 40
years of communist rule (Balzyca & Rapacki, 1991, p. 13). The early 1950s saw the strict
implementation of Stalinist polices by the premiership of Bolesław Bierut. A staunch
Stalinist, Bierut held Soviet-style purges and harshly imposed collectivization amount the
Polish peasantry. Mass protests in 1956 lead to Bierut’s resignation and the “thaw” that
was overseen by his successor, the moderate yet nationalistic Władysław Gomułka (Balzyca
& Rapacki, 1991, p. 13). These included the end of agricultural collectivization and the
opening of a small private sector (Balzyca & Rapacki, 1991, p. 13). Gomułka’s successor Edward Gierek allowed foreign investments into Poland and borrowed heavily from
Western European states in order to jump start Poland’s consumer goods industry (Balzyca
& Rapacki, 1991, p. 13). Yet, those loans amounted to immense debt, austerity, and the
eventual strikes in 1980.
Unlike other states in the Eastern Bloc, Poland had the unique case of having the
Catholic Church still in a prominent position in society. It provided one of the only free
spaces in which people can form free-accusations outside of party-sanctioned organizations
(Balzyca & Rapacki, 1991, p. 13). Concession won after the Gomułka Thaw—such as
the right to teach religion and publish books and newspaper— made the catholic Church
an even more viable alternative to party-sanctioned society (Balzyca & Rapacki, 1991, p.
5). In addition, the unsuccessful implementation of agricultural collectivization kept many
family and village bond intact (Balzyca & Rapacki, 1991, p. 5). These independent channels provide an excellent opportunity for people to organize against the communist regime,
creating a crucible in which developments in the relatively untouched underground to seep
into official organizations. The Church and local neighborly bonds allowed Solidarity to
form as a cohesive underground movement against the communist regime, especially when
most non-communist political organizations before the Second World War were either
completely crushed by Soviet forces or were merged with the PZPR.
Solidarity. In August 1980, Gdańsk workers went on strike at the Lenin Shipyards (Potel, 1981, p. 34). The strikes were originally economic in nature; the workers were
protesting high prices and low wages yet, the summer strikes catapulted Solidarity to the
forefront of Polish society and became the de facto opposition to communist rule in Poland
Historical Resistance Movements and Modern Euroscepticism
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(Potel, 1981, p. 35). Solidarity mostly consisted of independent trade unionists who sought
reforms of Polish labor system which might have led to further democratization, or what
the 1980 Solidarity convention platform called the “Self-Governing Republic” (Kowalik,
2012, p. 35). Instead, Solidarity managed to erode PZPR’s ideological influence on society,
leading to an eventual altercation in 1981 which triggered premier Wojciech Jaruzelski to
declare Martial law(Balzyca & Rapacki, 1991, p. 15). Seven years of violent crackdown and
upheaval following martial law finally lead the PZPR to sit down with Solidarity in April
1989 leading to the famous Round Table talks (Balzyca & Rapacki, 1991, p. 15). These
talks ended with a keen compromise: the technical “end” of communist rule in Poland and
free elections to the Polish Sejm that June, yet the lower house of the Sejm will have 65%
of its seats reserved for the PZPR (Balzyca & Rapacki, 1991, p. 15). Solidary won 99 of the
100 seats contested in the upper house and all remaining seats in the lower house (Balzyca
& Rapacki, 1991, p. 15). The 1989 election was the first and last time Solidarity ran as an
electoral force in Poland. The movement never had intentions to gain power, but only as
a catalyst of change (Wightman, 1995, p. 29). Because of that, Solidarity was much more
a collective, non-pluralistic movement were the ideology was merely patriotic and anticommunist (Wightman, 1995, p. 30). The years following the 1989 election experienced
the formation of various new parties and political movements, mostly of a result of divisions
within the Solidarity movement.
Party Formation. The 1991 election brought in the introduction of a more
complex party system in Poland. Over 150 parties registered with Polish election authorities that year, with 29 parties ending up with representation in the Sejm (Wightman, 1995,
p.35). From the 29, three main electoral stood out and have since dominated Polish politics:
1.

2.

3.

The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)- The SLD was formed out of the
remnants of the old PZPR and is widely considered a post-communist
party. It occupied the centre-left of the political spectrum and was home
to most of Poland’s social democrats and other leftists. The party showed a
commitment to both plural parliamentary democracy and a strong welfare
state (Wightman, 1995, p. 39). The SLD had poor electoral performance in
the 1991 election yet formed governments throughout the late 1990s until
it was reduced to a minor role in policy making after the 2005 election
(Wightman, 1995, p. 40).
The Democratic Union (UD)- The UD was one of the many parties formed
from the remnants of Solidarity’s electoral apparatus. Led by liberal Tadeusz
Mazowiecki, the party occupied the center of Polish politics. They centered
their platform on fiancé minister Leszek Balcerowicz’s economic liberalization plans (Wightman, 1995, p. 39). The UD lost popularity after the
1991 because of their association with the side effects of liberalization, yet
reemerged in the 2000s as the Civic Platform (PO) with stronger electoral
performance (Wightman, 1995, p. 40).
The Civic Center Accord (PC)- The PC represented the right-wing of the
Solidarity movement. The party was central in helping Lech Wałęsa win
the Polish presidency and prouded itself with its Solidarity connection. Lead
by twins Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński, the party fused economic liberalism,
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support for the working class, national Catholicism, and vehement anticommunism (Wightman, 1995, p. 29). The UC did not perform as well as
the other two during the 1991 election, but its successor Law and Justice
(PiS) has managed to become one of the most electorally successful parties
in recent Polish history (Rozworski, 2015, p. 1).
All three electoral blocs supported European integration throughout the 1990s and early
2000s (Dymek, 2015, p. 1). Many Poles saw joining the EU as the accumulation of what
they have been preparing since the end of Communism, the return to Western Civilization
(Dymek, 2015, p. 1). It was also seen as necessary in order for the SLD specifically to show
Poles that elites were committed to modernizing and developing Poland after 40 years of
underdevelopment. Former Polish president Aleksander Kwaśniewski—who has head the
SLD since its inception—even presided over the ceremony in which Poland entered the
EU (Dymek, 2015, p. 1). Yet, PC and its successor PiS had clear soft-Eurosceptic leanings.
Political scientist Desmond Dinan (2010) even wrote in his survey EU politics that when
Poland had their accession talks with the EU (of which were dominated by right-leaning
politicians in Poland), Poland “behaved at times as if the EU wanted to join it” (p. 139).
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość. PiS has been in power in Poland since 2015 after winning a landslide election, establishing Poland’s first majority government since the fall of
communism (Traub, 2016, p. 1). The party is a direct descendent of the right-wing UP of
the early 1990s and thus, having a direct link to the Solidarity. As aforementioned, the party
was founded by the Kaczyński twins in 2001 and have been one of the two dominate party’s in Poland political seen since the mid-2000s (Traub, 2016, p. 1). The reason for PiS’s
electoral success has been attributed to their capitalization of economic frustrations that are
presented amount (Traub, 2016, p. 1). Many in what is known as “Poland B”. “Poland
B” consists of the eastern and southern portions of Poland known to have experienced
the brunt of the negative side effects of Poland’s transition to capitalism (Kowalik, 2012,
p. 297). Thus, PiS capitalized on economic anxieties and conflated them with European
integration, especially when other parties such as PO which has been adamant with both
integration and liberalization (Kowalik, 2012, p. 208). Jarosław Kaczyński’s rhetoric at
a speech to the Heritage Foundation recently has emulated that view, saying that many
elites who have pushed for integration and liberalization, “had made no effort at changing
the social hierarchy, which remained dominated by ex-Communists. The old elite simply
exchanged its former political power for wealth,” (Traub, 2016, p. 1).
Conclusion
Both Spain and Poland have both managed to form competitive democratic systems after decades of authoritarian rule. Resistance movements in both states were both
ideological antithesis of the regime in power and used similar tactics of catch-all solidarity
in order to form momentum in ending each authoritarian regime. The Spanish resistance
was clearly pluralistic and liberal, while the Polish resistance was very much nationalistic
and big-tent. These differences did not hinder the formation of competitive party systems
in each state. Both states had their former regimes reorganize into competitive parties that
have accept to a certain degree liberal and pro-European norm. The electoral popularity
of the PP in Spain and the pro-Europeanism of the SLD demonstrates the attempts of forHistorical Resistance Movements and Modern Euroscepticism
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mer elites to reintegrate into the political scene. Also, the orientation of both state’s main
Eurosceptic parties demonstrate the connection of historical resistance movements and
Euroscepticism. Polish right-wing Euroscepticism and Spanish left-wing Euroscepticism
both can trace their roots to the radical extremes of their resistance movements, albeit either
through direct connections to the organizations of those movements (as PiS and Solidarity)
or in the ideology of said movements (as in Podemos and the radical leftist tradition of
student activism). Finally, even though both PiS and Podemos are of very different orientations on the political spectrum, both parties use similar rhetoric in order to form their
Eurosceptic ideologies: both PiS and Podemos capitalized on economic anxieties to perpetuate Euroscepticism in addition to conflating “out of touch” elites with totalitarianism.
Despite the clear connections presented in the case studies between resistance and
Euroscepticism, the case studies could have been enhanced by literature about party politics
in each respective state after the initial years of democratization. Such literature is lacking
in the body of scholarship in regard to European party politics. Yet with these conclusions
in mind, political scientists can have a better understanding of the nature and trajectory of
Eurosceptic politics in addition to predicating political climates after a state transitions to a
democratic state.
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